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Oil Wealth and Gender in Political and National Belonging
Oil-based economies drive a connection between national identity and support for
patriarchal belonging. Oil wealthy nations ensure that both men and women are
excluded from political participation, and thus have a weak civil society. Through
entrenching the population in the benefits of the oil economy, rentier states affirm that
there is a high level of national identity. A weak civil society and the patriarchal nature
of the oil wealth disenfranchises men and women, thus increasing women’s belief in the
effectiveness of a male leader.
The location of a natural resource is out of the control of those who inhabit the earth.
Upon discovering natural resources within the borders of a socially constructed state, it is the
task of the government and the state’s institutions to harness their power to direct the benefits of
the natural resources into a profit for the nation. As one of the world’s most sought after natural
resources, oil is a commodity that has been an economic, political, and social tool for those who
have had the geographical luck of residing in an oil wealthy nation. The purpose of this research
is to examine the impact that both oil wealth and gender have on individual feelings of national
identity and belonging, in order to draw conclusions about political autonomy in oil wealthy
nations.
The possession of oil is often considered to be a curse. Upon initial examination of the
abundance of a natural resource, it would be presumed that this would provide a wealth of
monetary, social, and economic benefits that would be spread throughout a population. This is
not the case, as speculation and subsequent evidence has proven that copious amounts of a
natural resource will inflict what has been deemed a “resource curse.” The resource curse, in the
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case of a wealth of oil, pertains to the, “...inverse association between growth and natural
resource abundance, especially minerals and oils (Karl 2007, 662).” The proof of this disparity
in development is staggering, and it presents extensive research as to why a valuable commodity,
with the potential of providing economic and social prosperity, has been manipulated by those
who have obtained power in oil wealthy nations.
Rentier states are the institutional proof of the numerous ways in which a natural
resource, in this case oil, has been a dominating factor in the maintenance and success of a state.
Cerny articulates the definition of the rentier state, in saying, “A rentier state and its economy
resemble a parasite. They stand and fall along with a non-productive type of economic activity,
such as income from the export of a natural resource (oil, natural gas, diamonds, time) or
collection charges for these raw materials (Cerny 2017, 148).” A nation’s oil rent is calculated to
determine the percentage of the gross domestic product that has been earned through the
production of the natural resource. The oil wealthy states of the Middle East are frequently and
correctly deemed rentier states, but these are not the only rentier states that have worked to
garner power through oil reserves. It should be noted that although Kuwait, a Middle Eastern
state in the Persian Gulf, had the highest oil rent in the world in 2011, the Republic of Congo
was just behind them. The former had attributed 60.2% of their gross domestic product to their
oil industry, while the latter attributed 57.4% of their gross domestic product to their respective
oil sales and production (The World Bank).
The Organisation of the Petroleum Organizing Countries was created in 1960 in
Baghdad, Iraq (OPEC.org: Brief History). The purpose of this organization is, “...in order to
secure fair and stable prices for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply
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of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on capital to those investing in the industry
(OPEC.org: Brief History).” None of the countries that form the Organisation of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) are democratic, as there is definitive documentation of the
repressive nature towards their populations (Cerny 2017, 150). The OPEC’s members are
working in conjunction to ensure their success, and an aspect of this success and effectiveness is
the power and oil that is wielded over their states, as to prevent any calls for regime change or
governmental accountability (Cerny 2017). Of the many ways in which oil wealthy nations seek
to employ their natural resource benefits, the OPEC should be of note as a way that oil
additionally impacts transnational relations. Wars have been fought over the natural resource,
and the importance and impact that oil has on society does not and should not go unnoticed.
Rentier states or oil wealthy nations draw attention to them for the ways in which they are
either providing for their populations or oppressing the people, in order to benefit those who are
at the top of the political food chain. Specifically in the Middle East, rentier states are often
critiqued for the oppression that they have implemented in the society towards women. This is
often perceived to be attributed to religion, but just as religion plays a strong role in society, so
does oil wealth. It is imperative to examine how oil plays a part in the oppression of a gender,
and the effects that it may have on the political inclusion and autonomy of populations in rentier
states.
It should be noted that an important political event occurred in the Middle East in 2011,
which is commonly referred to as the Arab Spring. During this time, the populations of Tunisia,
Egypt, and Libya worked to call for regime change and demanded that their governments
become representative of the desires of their entire nations. Other than Libya, which involved
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the influence and intervention of NATO, both Egypt and Tunisia did not have significant levels
of oil wealth that were at risk of being seized by the uprising population. The stakes to maintain
in power were high, but the lack of a natural resource affected the ability to suppress the
revolution.
Oil wealth is not something that can be manifested by a nation, but if a nation has oil
wealth, there is a societal expectation that this will be a contribution to the GDP of the respective
country. In order to understand the impact of oil, it is important to evaluate both the previous
findings about the natural resource and further advance the research in respect to gender and
national identity.
Literature Review
The Effects of Oil
As a highly sought after natural resource, the effects of oil have been documented for
their influence on governments and populations. Prior to understanding the relationship between
oil and gender, it is imperative to examine the research put forth on the effects that oil has in
democratic transitions, the economy, and the relationship that civilians of the state have with
their respective governments.
Scholars have long-debated the strength of oil’s influence on maintaining authoritarian
regimes. In addition to the belief that oil allows oppressive dictators to stave off potential
democratic demands, there is the belief that the outcome of any authoritarian regime transition
will be impacted by oil. Houle (2018) argues that oil has a conflicting effect on the progression
of authoritarian regimes to democracy. The argument is made that, “On the one hand, oil
stabilizes authoritarian regimes by increasing the amount of resources available for repression
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and co-optation, and by increasing the incentives of ruling elites to retain power. On the other
hand, oil also intensifies the incentives to take power and weakens the states (Houle 2018, 405).”
Houle concludes that once an authoritarian regime has failed, oil will be detrimental to the
outcome of the transition process and the likelihood that a democracy will be established (Houle
2018). The oil wealth may seem pertinent when controlling a population, but the hold that it has
on a state is evident regardless of the choice to transition into a democracy.
In addition to establishing the impact that oil will have in an evolving authoritarian
regime, many scholars have expounded upon the ways in which the leaders of oil rentier states
have employed their oil wealth to buy the population’s loyalty. Ross states that the oil rentier
governments have implemented this way of controlling the population for decades, as they
avoided pushes for democracy in the 1980s and 1990s through spending the earnings gained
while nationalizing the oil industry on social reforms (Ross 2011, 3). Additionally, these oil
wealthy states have not felt the financial pressure to collect a revenue from their citizens, thus
allowing for little to no taxes (Houle 2018, 408). The implementation of monetary reforms and
handouts ensures that these populations will have little reason to find fault with their
governments.
Ross counters the monetary benefits of oil wealth through comparing the freedoms
allotted to states in the Middle East with substantial oil reserves to those who have very little or
no oil. The countries with insignificant amounts of oil, such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and
Tunisia, provided their citizens with more freedoms (Ross 2011, 2). The grassroots work and
activism done in the Arab Spring stemmed from the minute amount of freedom that was granted
to the civilians of oil-poor Middle Eastern states. These states did not have natural resources to
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rely on to fund their government with no accountability to their citizens, which allowed for a
more open examination of the freedoms given and the taxes taken. The Arab Spring and the
mass uprisings in the Middle East in 2011 are evidence that even the markedly more-free
societies were still oppressed to a degree, but their oppression was not accompanied by monetary
funds that warranted the poor treatment by their governments. Ross qualifies this, in saying,
“The region’s dictators and monarchs have used oil revenues to finance vast patronage networks,
which typically entangle both these regimes’ supporters and their potential opponents; these
networks make it harder for independent civil-society groups to take root (Ross 2011, 5).” The
research done by Ross advances the idea that civil society lacks the mechanisms to join together
politically.
In addition to this, there is the active manipulation of the population, as these leaders
understand what is at stake, should they be held accountable for their actions. Houle reaffirms
this perception that leaders of oil rentier states understand the monetary wealth and power that
would be given up, if they did not have the capabilities and institutional implementations to
control their populations. This is qualified by the findings that these states with vast amounts of
oil have “weaker civil societies,” as people are not independent of the state (Houle 2018, 408).
Houle counters the theory that there is a complete division between the state institutions and the
people; the government is operating without the input of the people, but they are not operating
without the ability to implement the control and the threat of the larger government. There is the
unspoken understanding that the government has provided the social reforms and financial
benefits for their population, which leads the population to be reluctant to question the
parameters that the government has set up about political involvement and freedom of speech.
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In furthering the literature on oil rentiers, Salehi-Ifsahani outlines the developmental
plans that are implemented by governments, in order to gain the loyalty of their populations.
This is not something that the governments are implementing with the hope that the population is
receptive, but this is a plan that is strategic in understanding the positive connotations that could
be associated with a thriving oil industry and the government that is directing the revenue to
those who reside within the state. Salehi-Ifsahani acknowledges the benefits of distributing oil
revenues, but does acknowledge the ways in which oil wealth and subsequent monetary
distribution is accompanied by accusations about the amount that citizens receive. This is
outlined in examining the accessibility to revenue information of an average citizen: “Because it
is difficult for an average citizen to determine if the oil wealth is fairly distributed, charges of
corruption and unfair distribution abound. Oil-exporting societies are therefore more prone to
social tension arising from distribution than countries in which governments define their role
more in the accumulation of national wealth in dividing it up (Salehi-Isfahani 2009, 5).” This
counterpoint on the criticism of the government and their distribution practices is important to
note, as these deeply rooted frustrations with the mismanagement of society contradict the
perception of the strength of the rentier state.
Oil is further evaluated through the lens of the limitations of natural resources, as
Mitchell believes that there will come a time when oil no longer has a stronghold over the
actions of rentier states. Mitchell presents concerns about climate change and limited resources:
“Global oil resources, as the disagreements about peak oil suggest, cannot easily be counted, but
until recently they could be counted on, for there were always reserves available...It could be
consumed as if there was no need to take account that its supply was not replenishable (Mitchell
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2011, 234).” There has always been an assumption that oil is a constant in the political world, but
Mitchell makes the valid and important point that there will come a time when the oil rentier
states will not be able to employ oil to benefit their own maintenance of power. This will play a
role in understanding the political autonomy, or lack thereof, among rentier state populations.
The literature on rentier states promotes the concept of the strong government employing
their oil wealth, in order to control and resist the potential demands of an oppressed population.
Gender
Understanding gender is a key to understanding the manipulation that the government has
done to ensure that the population does not have a unified identity. As previously stated, the
rentier state seeks to divide the population and ensure that some people are included, while
others are not. At a fundamental and simplified level, this is done through the division and
exclusion of one gender over another. In rentier states, gender divisions and differences are
exploited to exclude women from the economy, and thus excluding them from the state.
Due to the fact that many oil rentiers are located in the Middle East, it is necessary to
examine the prior literature that has represented the state sanctioned feminism of some states and
the gender repression by other countries. The negatives of gender in the Middle East are often
highlighted, but state feminism occurred in some Middle Eastern countries in the twentieth
century, in which Western ideas were introduced to states such as Iran (Moaddel 2013). In the
years that followed the open practices of gender equality, a more close-minded and religious
perspective was established for some states: “They rejected the idea of gender equality and
gender segregation and the institution of male domination in the family, politics, and labor
market. In places like Saudi Arabia and Iran under the Islamic Republic, women are reduced to
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second-class citizens (Moaddel 2013, 49).” This is just an aspect of controlling a nation, and
thus should be examined as what it is: the implementation of gender and religious crackdowns, in
order to exercise all potential levels of control. As previously mentioned, the literature supports
the belief that those who have control of the oil rent are more likely to go to great lengths to
ensure that they have maintained that control. This report on gender equality in different parts of
the Middle East highlights the gender inequality that was institutionalized by the state in Saudi
Arabia and Iran, which are two countries that have high levels of oil wealth.
Another aspect of gender differences is represented in the education of women and their
unwillingness to use the degree that they have acquired. Markle argues this, as families in oil
wealthy nations push for the education of their daughters, in order for them to find capable
husbands; there is never a strong intent to use the degree that these women have pursued (Markle
2012). Instead, Markle explains that these women are expected to aid their families in ways that
are not marked by a salary or official entrance into the workforce. She furthers the arguments, as
she qualifies this with the explanation that, “Because women are traditionally discouraged from
entering the oil market, they are encouraged to enter fields of social science and avoid
higher-paying, male-dominated jobs in oil and business (Markle 2012).” This is an additional
way in which the oil industry disproportionately impacts women. Not only are they relegated to
jobs that do not involve the oil industry, when they are in the workforce, they are expected to
seek out the social sciences. The socialization of the social sciences and the lack of mingling
with oil jobs perpetuates the gender disparities and the distance that women feel from the society
and from exercising their own political autonomy.
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Ross furthers the strength of the oil argument in examining the ways in which the Dutch
Disease affects female involvement in the workforce. The Dutch Disease model exemplifies the
ways in which the non-trade sector of the economy expands, while the trade sector of an oil
wealthy state declines (Ross 2008). The growth of this aspect of the economy has a significant
impact on the women, more so than the men, as it affects their overall involvement in the
workforce. Ross advances the argument between the oil industry and female labor in saying,
“The persistence of patriarchy in the Middle East has relatively little to do
with Islam, but much to do with the region’s oil based economy. Economic
growth that is based on export-oriented manufacturing and agriculture tends to
benefit women; economic growth based on oil exports diminishes their role in
the workforce and the political sphere, and hence allows patriarchal norms,
laws, and institutions to endure (Ross 2008, 120).”
Ross is refusing to attribute the lack of political involvement for women to their religious beliefs,
as there is instead a prevalent economic reason for their failure to mobilize in groups. If women
are only exposed to the ideas of the male members of their society, who are socialized through
oil industry jobs, they are hearing of only positive impressions of the government from these
men. Men would not have these industry jobs and this way to further the patriarchal practices of
the society without said jobs and the natural resource in the first place. Ross seeks to exemplify
the detriments that oil will have on women and their presence in the workforce.
The literature on the rentier state is important in examining the gender disparities, as it
signifies further exclusion of women from their contributions to the national identity. Cerny
states that, “The huge funds allocated to the military contribute to the unequal dispensation of
resources among segments of the population loyal to the regime and the rest of unprivileged
society excluded from the distribution of resources. The army’s control methods systematically
generate social segmentation and polarisation (Cerny 2017, 170).” By nature, the military is a
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predominantly male institution, and they are already indoctrinated into the nation’s identity
without the revenue and benefits that they receive for their service. The loyalty and national
identity of this strengthens their own belief that they would have political autonomy, as they are
government actors. Women often do not serve in the military, which further excludes them from
contributing to the institution and reaping the rewards that have been allotted to service
members. The gendered nature of this literature and the societal divisions that it perpetuates
further the examination of how rentier states separate civil society and ensure its weakness.
It is imperative to evaluate the ways in which a state transitioning to democracy would
handle gendered mobilization for a cause. As previously mentioned, there are a significant
number of reasons why an oil rentier state would not have the incentive to transition to
democracy, but the evaluation of women’s movements in democratic transition provides an
example of what may occur without the presence of oil. Baldez argues that, “The exclusion of
women and women’s concerns from the agendas by primarily male opposition leaders heightens
the political salience of gender relative to other cleavages and triggers the formation of a united
front among women’s organizations (Baldez 2003, 254).” This exclusion ensures that women
are willing to overlook their differences for the benefit of uniting on the basis of their gender;
women are excluded from the practices of democratic transition and use this as a mobilizing
factor to create change. Baldez goes on to argue that in all cases of women’s mobilization, they
were able to create these movements through both formal and informal practices of networking
and institutions (Baldez 2003, 254). Another important aspect of these women’s reasons for
mobilizing were their, “...exclusion from the process of realignment within the democratic
opposition catalyzed the formation of a formal coalition among diverse women’s organizations
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(Baldez 2003, 268).” These women were not included in providing input to those who had taken
control of the democratic process, and had likely carried out the actions that prompted the
democratic transition, but they overlooked the underlying differences and diverse reasons to gain
input, in order to achieve political autonomy and influence.

Political Autonomy
Involvement in the political process and the belief that each individual has some level of
influence is a foundational practice of exercising political autonomy. The literature fails to
examine the ways in which oil plays a part in the political autonomy of women, but political
autonomy as a whole has been evaluated.
In the Middle East in particular, when oil wealth abounds, the political autonomy is
weak. Tetreault explains this: “Yet oil money also changed the balance of power between state
and society in oil exporting countries, giving many local rulers the ability to suppress popular
institutions and thwart traditional checks on their authority. Thus, on a whole, oil has decreased
legitimate political participation in the region as a whole (Tetreault 2014, 1).” There is no way
in which members of a Middle Eastern country that is rich in oil and poor in proper democratic
functions can discover a way to assert their political power. Political autonomy is not prevalent
in the oil wealthy states as whole, as the governments are reluctant to relinquish any power that
could sacrifice the control of the oil wealth.
How Does Gender Affect Political Autonomy in Oil Wealthy States?
The leaders of oil rentier states have honed in on the manipulation of their populations, in
order to understand ways in which to stave off calls for change and subsequent accountability.

13
Oil rentier states have effectively withstood the test of time and the potential threat of revolution,
proving the influence that oil can wield over those who are impressionable members of a nation.
I hypothesize that when individuals, especially women, reside in states with high levels
of oil rent and have high levels of national identity, they are more likely to support the
effectiveness of a male leader. The null hypothesis would present findings that support the
perception that these women in the oil wealthy nations are more likely to believe that female
politicians are more effective politicians. This hypothesis does not seek to solely understand the
perceptions of government representation, but it seeks to understand the perceptions of women
and thus their own political autonomy in regards to oil wealth.
Much of the literature on gender would presume that these women have little national
identity, but the financial benefits they receive from the government maintains their loyalty and
the falsehood that they are active contributors to the composition of the rentier state. Despite the
fact that women are excluded from employment in the oil industry, as they are pushed towards
domestic work in their own homes or work in the social sciences, they still reap the benefits of
oil employment. Men are consistently tied to the success of the oil economy and are
compensated for the success of said economy, which provides their entire households with
money that is reflective of the operations of the rentier state. The success of men due to the oil
industry and the lack of female involvement in the workforce provides two factors that
strengthen the belief of women in male leaders: they do not have the opportunity to overcome
differences in order to mobilize for a women’s movement and their perception of the oil industry
is based on the successes of their male relatives.
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The involvement of political autonomy in this research is for the goal of attaining and
understanding the individual woman and her perception of the political sector. Not all women
are going to seek to achieve a position in government or desire a leadership role, but the
perceptions of this capability and the ways in which gender affect individual beliefs are
imperative to understanding the political autonomy of these individuals.

Research Design
Introduction
H1: When individuals reside in states with high levels of oil rent and have high levels of national
identity, they are more likely to support the effectiveness of a male leader.
To test the hypothesis that examines the influence of gender and national identity, I
employed the data findings of both the World Bank and the World Values Survey (Wave 6:
2010-2014). The World Bank findings chart the oil rents, or the percentage of the countries’
GDP that is attributed to the oil industry, which is an important aspect in understanding which
states have a significant rentier effect and which do not. To ensure that Libya, a significant oil
rent state, is accounted for, the oil rentier data employed in this research is from 2011; this
coincides with the time in which the World Values Survey was performed, and occurs before the
failure of the Libyan state during the Arab Spring. The World Values Survey is valuable in
examining the ways in which people have feelings about the capacity of politicians to lead and
the feelings that they have about national identity. In collecting data for the World Values
Survey, those who were surveyed were asked to rank their feelings about the effectiveness of a
male political leader over the effectiveness of female political leader. As the World Values
Survey does not directly question each of the respondents’ beliefs on political autonomy, the
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perception that they have towards the effectiveness of politicians is the instrumental way in
which this hypothesis will be tested. The World Values Survey data, coupled with the World
Bank data, is effective in determining how oil wealth and national identity affect both male and
female perceptions of the effectiveness of politicians.

Variable Measurements
In order to operationalize the dependent variable on if women make better politicians
than men, I use the independent variable that evaluates the level of national identity that the
respondent feels. The scale is coded from 1 to 4, as those answering with 1 show that the
respondent feels strongly about their membership in their respective nation. If the respondent
answers with 4, it signifies that they do not feel as if they have a national identity. The mean
value in the WVS from 2010 to 2014 was 1. 5, as more people felt the inclusivity in the nation
and that part of their identity than did not.
In order to operationalize the dependent variable on if women make better politicians
than men, I use the independent variable that codes for the level of oil rent in each country. The
oil rent scale is from 0.0 percent of the GDP to 60.2 percent of the GDP. The mean value of oil
rent in the WVS is 6.15 percent of the GDP in 2011.
In order to operationalize the dependent variable on if women make better politicians
than men, I use the independent variable that interacts the influence of oil, feelings of national
identity, and gender at the same time. In generating this interaction, it allows for an independent
variable that reflects national identity, oil, and gender as they act on the dependent variable.
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In order to operationalize the dependent variable on if women make better politicians
than men, I use the independent variable that evaluates the importance of politics in the
respondents’ lives. This represents on a scale from very important (1) to not very important (4).
The average respondent found politics to be somewhat important in their lives.
In order to operationalize the dependent variable on if women make better politicians
than men, I use the independent variable that codes the ages of the respondents. The youngest
respondent in the WVS was 16, while the oldest respondent was 102. This creates the mean
value of 41.9.
Additionally, I used the independent variables that recognized the number of years of
education that the respondent had and whether or not the countries in the WVS were considered
to be part of the Global North or the Global South.

Table 1: The Variables
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Model Estimation
Due to the four possible categories of the dependent variable, WomenBetterPoliticians,
an ordered probit regression was used to examine the perception of a number of WVS values on
the variable. The interaction that included oil, gender, and national identity was performed, as it
allowed for gender to be controlled. In doing this, the model created a set of findings and
graphs, which were able to reflect the feelings of both female and male respondents at the same
time. In working to understand the feelings of women in oil rich states, it is imperative that the
there is a way to examine the differences that occur in the gendered response to the question; two
tables will be provided that represent the different p-values that occur when either a male or a
female responds to the questions in the World Values Survey. The interaction used for both
models was generated between Oil Rent, ImNotPartofNation, and Gender, in which
OilPartNation was created. As gender was controlled for in this interaction, it does not need to
be represented in the descriptive title of the independent variable.
The goal of the model was to examine how both males and females perceived the gender
of politicians, when they specifically acknowledged the value that they placed on politics. It
should be noted that when the respondents evaluated their feelings about the value that they
placed on politics in their lives, there was no significant difference in the results of the model.
The model interacted the level of oil rent in the nation with both feelings of belonging in the
nation and gender, and I controlled for age and level of education. The control variables for this
model were the mean of the observants’ age and the mean of the observants’ years of education.
This approximated an average of 41.9 years of age for those who were questioned. The oil rent
independent variable had values anywhere between 0.0 and 60.2. The feelings about being part
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of the nation independent variable were coded on a scale between one and four, in which coding
one meant that the respondent felt that they were a significant part of the nation and a four meant
that they did not feel as if they were a part of their nation. The variables chosen for the
interaction were Oil rent, ImNotPartofNation, and Gender, as they would represent the ways in
which these feelings had influenced perceptions of the gender of politicians.
Results
Table 2: Effects on the Belief that Men Make Better Politicians than Women

Note: from left to right: both men and women; men; women
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Model 1: Perception of Male Leadership

This model rejects the null hypothesis that oil rent and national identity have no effect on
perceptions that women make better politicians than men in states that have both high oil rent
and high levels of national identity. The confidence intervals are statistically significant at a 99
percent confidence level for all of the variables, which affirms that the model would reject the
null hypothesis. The regression coefficient of oil rent has a negative value, which shows the
significance that oil has on the dependent variable. The regression coefficients of age and years
of education are significant, yet they are not as significant as the other coefficients. The
significance of the interaction between oil rent, national participation, and gender are also
statistically significant and reaffirm the rejection of the null hypothesis. This model provides
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significant evidence that high levels of national identity and oil rent play a role in the level of
effectiveness that both men and women find in a male leader.
Discussion and Conclusions
The data supports the argument that women in countries with high levels of oil wealth
and the belief that they are part of the nation, are more likely to support the effectiveness of a
male leader. This is an important finding, as it furthers the work to understand the involvement
of women in the political process and how their national identity plays a role when their country
is rich with oil wealth.
The past literature seeks to analyze the rentier states and their direct involvement with the
entire population; none of the literature furthers the argument that women do not see
representation of themselves in the government. Additionally, there is a lack of literature that
pertains to the strength that people truly believe that they can make an impact on the
government; it is important to analyze the level of political autonomy for women in a patriarchal
society. Yes, it can be argued that the disenfranchised male members of an oil wealthy society,
living without significant amounts of wealth, do not see representation for themselves in the
government. The prior literature on the topic advances the notion that their economic access and
their role as men ties them further into the political circle of the government; these men may not
have any true influence, but their feelings of impactfulness are stronger than those of women.
The literature on the oil rentier effect is sparse in analyzing political autonomy as a whole, but it
is imperative that women are highlighted in literature that is created in the future. As evidenced
throughout the examination of the past literature, men are more included in the economic aspects
of the state and thus are allotted more involvement at a fundamental level. These findings
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further the examination of the oil rentier effect and the ways in which gender is further impacted
by significant amounts of wealth. There is a gap in the literature in regards to women’s political
autonomy and national identity in an oil rentier state, and the findings in this work seek to
provide some comparative explanation on the topic of oil and gender.
The results of this study affirm the hypothesis that women in oil wealthy countries who
identify with the nation will be more likely to find men more capable of being successful leaders.
Additionally, the findings reflected the finding that men are likely to have the same feelings
towards political leaders, when oil and national identity are factored in. The null hypothesis was
rejected, but it is significant to note that both men and women in these oil rentier states find men
to be more capable than those who do not have oil wealth. The impact of oil was strongest in
affecting the perspectives of all men and women, regardless of how much they valued politics.
As oil wealth rose, so did their confidence in a male leader. National identity played a part in
further enfranchising these women into the nation, as the oil wealth and the lack of civil societies
fails to separate them from their government. They do not see the significance, or fail to act on
it, upon realizing that becoming ingrained in their national identity is detrimental to their
political autonomy.
The data, specifically in Table 2 and Table 3, provides significant findings that both men
and women have the same feelings about their belief in the effectiveness of a male leader over a
female leader. National identity plays a role in this, as the oil rentier state forms a codependence
between the population and the government that does not allow for free thought or ways in which
political mobilization is possible. Men are more capable of creating a political movement
through socialization in the workforce, but the lack of a strong civil society in rentier states

22
prevents this from happening. Men may not have the ability to form political coalitions that have
an impact on governmental actions, but male representation in the government further enhances
their self perceptions and individual political autonomy. Women do not share this same
opportunity for representation, as the patriarchal dominance of the rentier state prevents these
feelings of female political capability from emerging. In lacking political representation and the
ability to mobilize for political change with the foundational support of a women’s movement,
women do not have the societal influence and capacity to form national identities that are
separate from the state. Thus, women belong to a unified national identity that is also made up
of the men of the nation; there is no separation based on gender and there is no separation based
on those in power and those who are not in power.
The findings in this work further open the door to continued examination of political
autonomy regarding oil wealth. The statistical significance of national identity and the role that
it has played in the furthering women’s belief in the male leader begs the question as to what will
be the breaking point for those who are receiving these oil revenues. Will there be a traceable
moment in which their values fail to align with those of the oil rentier government? How strong
is oil wealth on overall values and how has the longevity of the oil nations in any way affected
the value system of entire populations? The conclusivity of oil and national identity strength on
the perception of men making better politicians opens the door to more examination of the
relationship that the two have with oil in a rentier state.
In conclusion, women who have a high sense of national identity and reside in an oil
wealthy state are more likely to believe that male politicians would be more capable than female
politicians. This supports the overarching perception that women who do not have political
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autonomy, but are tied to their governments through the benefits from high oil revenue, fail to
see the potential for their own political impact and involvement. This is furthered through the
national identity, as oil rentier states work to ingratiate themselves to their populations, without
granting the civilians any actual political capacity. Overall, the strength of oil prevails, thus
impacting both gender and political autonomy.
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